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THE RAILROAD QUESTION REVISITED
CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE & ST. PAUL RAILWAY V. MINNESOTA
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON STATE REGULATIONS

JAMES W. ELY, JR.
Few issues more vexed Americans during the
Gilded Age than the regulation of railroads.
America's first big business, the railroads wielded
enormous economic power and by the end of
the nineteenth century represented 10 percent
of national wealth. 1 Farmers and other local
shippers often viewed railroads as an exploitative monopoly and blamed them for excessive
and discriminatory charges. They repeatedly
clamored for regulation of the freight and passenger rates fixed by railroad companies. Agricultural interests in the Great Plains states
were particularly active in seeking regulatory
legislation. Railroad investors and managers, on
the other hand, opposed regulatory laws and

defended their autonomy to determine rates.
They feared that governmental control of rates
would benefit shippers and farmers at the expense of the railroads by imposing unreasonably
low charges. Moreover, they asserted that regulation of rates would likely impair capital investment and thus stifle railroad growth and
economic development.
Sectional division was evident in the legislative response to the growth of railroads. The
eastern states created advisory commissions that
could make reports and recommend reforms but
had no enforcement power or authority to set
transportation rates. 2 Skeptical about the efficacy of competition, western farmers demanded
more stringent governmental control of railroad
operations. Their growing resentment was
heightened when western railroads passed under
the control of eastern investors. During the
1870s the Granger movement spearheaded the
drive for the initial wave of more radical state
railroad regulations. Many midwestern and
southern state legislatures enacted so-called
Granger laws to control the prices charged by
railroads and related utilities, such as grain elevators and warehouses. They also established
powerful commissions to supervise railroad operations and enforce regulatory laws. 3
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In Munn v. Illinois (1877) the Supreme Court
adopted a deferential attitude toward legislative
authority to regulate economic activity. Sustaining an Illinois law that set the rate for storing grain in Chicago elevators, Chief Justice
Morrison R. Waite ruled that "when private
property is devoted to a public use, it is subject
to public regulation." Whether this public interest doctrine applied to a particular enterprise
was considered a matter for legislative judgment. Although recognizing that the owner of
property "clothed with a public interest" was
entitled to reasonable compensation, Chief Justice Waite further declared that the determination of such compensation was a legislative,
not a judicial, task. The only protection for
property owners against legislative abuse was
resort to the political process. Justice Stephen
J. Field vigorously dissented, warning that under the Munn rationale "all property and all
business in the State are held at the mercy of
a majority of its legislature." Asserting that grain
storage was a private business, he maintained
that the due process clause afforded substantive
protection to owners in the use and income of
their property.4 In practice state legislatures rarely
applied the Munn doctrine to control the charges
of any major business other than railroads.
Ouring the 1880s judicial attitudes began to
change. The Supreme Court receded from the
deferential approach of Munn and adopted a
more skeptical posture toward state regulation
of property and business. In Stone v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co. (1886), for instance, the justices upheld a Mississippi statute that empowered a commission to regulate railroad rates, but
they cautioned that such authority was not unlimited. Chief Justice Waite observed that "the
State cannot require a railroad corporation to
carry persons or property without reward; neither can it do that which in law amounts to a
taking of private property for public use without
just compensation, or without due process of
law."5 Simultaneously the Supreme Court began to formulate a substantive interpretation of
the due process clause to safeguard fundamental
property rights. 6 This laid the basis for the doctrine of economic due process. The court took

another step away from Munn in Wabash, StLouis & Pacific Railway v. Illinois (1886), holding
that state regulation of interstate railroad rates
unconstitutionally invaded federal power under
the commerce clause. 7
State courts likewise moved toward increased
scrutiny of rate regulations. In Spring Valley Water
Works v. San Francisco (1890) the Supreme Court
of California invalidated a municipal ordinance
fixing the rates charged by a privately-owned
water company. Cautioning that "[r]egulation,
as provided for in the constitution, does not
mean confiscation, or a taking without just
compensation," the court asserted judicial authority to review the reasonableness of regulated
prices. 8
Historians agree that Chicago, Milwaukee &
St. Paul Railway Company v. Minnesota (1890)
was a milestone in the evolution of economic
due process. 9 The decision inaugurated an era
of increased judicial scrutiny of railroad and utility rate fixing and enhanced the protection of
property rights. Yet this landmark ruling has
received relatively little attention from scholars. In view of the renewed interest in economic
rights,1O it seems pertinent to examine the litigation that culminated in Chicago, Milwaukee ll
and to assess the decision's place in constitutional history.
BACKGROUND OF THE CONTROVERSY

In the early 1870s Minnesota experimented
briefly with railroad rate regulation but abandoned the system in 1875 amid fears that
governmental controls discouraged capital investment. A decade later many western and
southern states joined in a new wave of stringent railroad rate regulations. 12 Minnesota was
no exception. Republicans dominated Minnesota politics throughout the Gilded Age, a fact
that underscores the public consensus favoring
regulation of railroad activities. In March of
1887 the Minnesota legislature enacted a comprehensive scheme to regulate the intrastate activities of common carriers. 13 Building upon 1885
legislation that established the Railroad and
Warehouse Commission, lawmakers provided
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FIG. 1. A Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway passenger train leaving the Milwaukee Union Depot about
1890. Photograph courtesy of the Milwaukee Public Library, Milwaukee Road Collection.

that all charges for railroad services "shall be
equal and reasonable."
Carriers were required to file a schedule of
rates with the commission, and the commissioners were empowered to review the reasonableness of charges. The commission could order
a railroad to change any fare deemed unequal
or unreasonable and could impose a recommended rate. If a railroad failed to comply with
such a rate directive the commission could seek
a writ of mandamus. The statute also prohibited
unreasonable preferences to any shipper and
outlawed rebates and the practice of charging
more for transportation for a short distance than
a long distance. Because at that time neither
the Interstate Commerce Commission nor most
state railroad commissions had the authority to

fix charges, the Minnesota law went beyond the
prevailing regulatory models.
Organized under Wisconsin law in 1874, the
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company was the successor to numerous small railroads. By the late 1880s the company owned
nearly 6000 miles of completed track, more than
1400 grain elevators, and numerous terminal
facilities. The railroad's main line ran between
Minneapolis and St. Paul and Chicago, and
other lines extended into Iowa, Wisconsin, Nebraska, and the Dakotas. It was one of four
major carriers that served the northern prairie
states. 14 Operating in states strongly influenced
by Granger agitation, the Chicago, Milwaukee
& St. Paul Railway had long battled state fare
regulations.
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In June of 1887 local boards of trade complained to the Minnesota Railroad Commission
that the rates charged by the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway for transporting milk
from various points within Minnesota to St.
Paul and Minneapolis were unreasonably high.
The company countered that the milk rates were
in fact low. After a hearing at which both the
petitioners and the railroad were represented,
the commission concluded that the charges for
transporting milk from Owatonna and Faribault
were unreasonable. The commission directed
that a rate of 211z cents per gallon in ten-gallon
cans be substituted for the existing rate of 3
cents per gallon. When the railroad refused to
carry out the recommended reduction in milk
rates, the attorney general, acting for the commission, procured a writ of mandamus from the
Supreme Court of Minnesota directing the railroad to obey the order or show cause why it
should not be followed. The railroad challenged
the constitutionality of the rate fixing provision
on three grounds: (1) that the legislative authority to set transportation rates could not be
delegated to the commission, (2) that under its
franchise the railroad was entitled to determine
transportation rates, and (3) that the commission's order constituted "a pro tanto taking" of
the railroad's property in violation of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Counsel further argued that the statute did not
provide for a hearing and that the reasonableness of rates was a judicial question. 15
The Supreme Court of Minnesota unanimously upheld the commission's order in April
of 1888. After disposing of jurisdictional
issues, the court considered the nature of the
commission's rate-setting powers. The court
construed the statute to mean that rates recommended by the commission "should be not
simply advisory, nor merely prima facie equal
and reasonable, but final and conclusive as to
what are lawful or equal and reasonable
charges. "16 Consequently the court refused to
review the reasonableness of rates set by the
commission.
Turning to the constitutional objections, the
court relied heavily on the Munn decision and

stressed the need for legislative control of railroads. The court described railroads as "practically the public highway system of the country,"
and declared that "no modem civilized community could long endure that their public
highway system should be in the uncontrolled,
exclusive use of private owners. The only alternative was either governmental regulation or
governmental ownership of the roads." 17 The
court charged that railroads, "and even the eminent counsel for the respondent in this case,"
were reluctant to accept the legitimacy of legislative supervision. Nor were the judges sympathetic to the argument that the power to fix
rates might be abused and in effect deprive the
railroads of property without due process. Last
the court rejected the contention that the act
improperly delegated legislative power to the
commission. The judges reasoned that the legislature had not conferred upon the commission
power to make law but simply granted administrative discretion to carry out the regulatory
purpose of the statute.
The Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway
petitioned for a reargument in part on the
grounds that the court did not consider later
rulings that limited the Munn decision. When
this petition was denied the company obtained
a writ of error to bring the case before the Supreme Court of the United States. Meanwhile,
the order of the commission went into effect.
SUPREME COURT DECISION

The appeal was argued before the Supreme
Court on 13 and 14 January 1890. The railroad
was represented by its able general counsel, John
W. Cary. He was experienced in rate litigation
before the Supreme Court, having previously
appeared in several companion cases to Munn. 18
A proponent of laissez-faire constitutionalism,
Cary labored to secure judicial protection for
the rights of railroads against state regulation.
He espoused the principle that property ownership encompassed the right to set the price
for its use. Cary argued that in order to vindicate
property rights the reasonableness of rates was
a matter for judicial inquiry. In short, Cary was
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prominent among a group of attorneys who were
instrumental in promoting laissez-faire values
and advocating a strong role for the courts in
limiting state regulatory power. 19
This laissez-faire philosophy guided Cary's
arguments on behalf of the Chicago, Milwaukee
& St. Paul Railway. He first contended that the
rate-setting provisions violated the corporate
charter in which the Minnesota Territory granted
the railroad directors power to fix "the rate of
tolls." Hence the Minnesota legislation unconstitutionally impaired the obligation of contract
by interfering with the company's rights under
its charter. 20
More significantly Cary then endeavored to
restrict application of the Munn decision. Insisting that the right to receive value for use of
one's property was an essential attribute of ownership, he charged that the Minnesota court
judgment "violates the natural right which belongs to every one to fix the price of his services
and of his property or its use." Cary conceded
that Munn limited a railroad to charging reasonable rates, but he denied a legislature's "right
to arbitrarily and finally fix or determine such
charges by positive statutes." He agreed that a
legislature, under its police power, could regulate railroad operations to protect the safety of
persons. Cary maintained, however, that this
power did not give lawmakers the right to fix
transportation charges. In an impassioned plea,
Cary argued that rate regulation was unprecedented and "destructive of the rights of property
and more to be feared than the insane ravings
of the advocates of socialism and the commune." He charged that railroads could be compelled to provide services at an unremunerative
rate, effectively confiscating their property. Thus
Cary sought to reopen the broad question of
legislative control of railroad fares. Contending
that "[i)nvestments in railroad property are entitled to the same protection and consideration
as other investments," he maintained that a
reasonable rate must include "a fair return on
the value of the investment or plant of the
railroad. "21 Cary finished by arguing that the
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway was
engaged in interstate commerce and was not
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FIG. 2. John W. Cary (1817-1895) was the principal
legal advisor of the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul
Railway for many years and argued on behalf of the
carrier in the famous Chicago, Milwaukee case. Photograph courtesy of the Milwaukee Public Library,
Milwaukee Road Collection.

subject to the Minnesota law since passage of
the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887.
Attorney General Moses E. Clapp defended
the Minnesota rate-fixing act. As might be expected, he emphasized the "unbroken line" of
Supreme Court decisions commencing with
Munn that sustained the power of legislatures
to establish rates for common carriers. He recognized that a state could not use regulatory
authority to confiscate property but disputed the
company's allegations that the milk rate was
unreasonable. Clapp concluded by emphasizing
first that state legislatures could decide what
constituted a reasonable transportation rate and
second that "the question of the reasonableness
of the rate is a question for legislative determination, and when so determined, ceases to
be the subject of judicial inquiry. "22
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On 24 March the Supreme Court in a brief
opinion ruled that the rate statute, as construed
by the Minnesota Supreme Court, deprived the
railroad of property without due process of law. 23
Chief Justice Melville W. Fuller assigned the
task of preparing the court's opinion to Justice
Samuel Blatchford. One historian has suggested
that this assignment was prompted by Fuller's
belief that Blatchford, a consensus builder, could
fashion an opinion that would hold together a
precarious majority for a significant constitutional innovation. 24
The court first rejected the railroad's contract clause argument. Justice Blatchford held
that the general language in the company's
charter conferring the power to collect tolls did
not constitute a contract freeing the company
from any legislative control. This finding simply
affirmed the settled doctrine that corporate
charters were strictly construed.
The justices, however, found a procedural
infirmity in the Minnesota rate law. Although
the precise nature of the defect was unclear from
the opinion, the court was obviously disturbed
about the conclusive nature of the administrative process that determined rates. Justice
Blatchford pointed out that the statute did not
provide for notice or a hearing before the commission or for judicial review of rates. 25 This
was a somewhat curious point because, in fact,
the company received both notice and a hearing. Justice Blatchford was seemingly concerned
that the commission might find rates to be unreasonable sua sponte without any hearing.
The court then moved beyond this procedural objection and asserted the authority to
review the fairness of rates imposed by state law.
"The question of the reasonableness of a rate
of charge for transportation by a railroad company," Justice Blatchford observed, " . . . is
eminently a question for judicial investigation,
requiring due process of law for its determination." He added:
If the company is deprived of the power of
charging reasonable rates for the use of its

property, and such deprivation takes place
in the absence of an investigation by judicial
machinery, it is deprived of the lawful use
of its property, and thus, in substance and
effect, of the property itself, without due process of law and in violation of the Constitution of the United States. 26
Blatchford's opinion was somewhat nebulous
with re~pect to the scope of judicial review and
did not expressly direct a judicial investigation
of rates. But the ruling has generally been
understood as establishing that the reasonableness of rates was subject to independent court
review. Thus, the Chicago, Milwaukee decision
contradicted a fundamental principle of Munn
that rate setting was solely a legislative function. Moreover, it signaled the court's acceptance of the due process clause as a substantive
restriction on state legislation authority.
Concurring "with some hesitation," Justice
Samuel F. Miller provided a more compelling
explanation of the constitutional need for judicial review of rates. He recognized that the
states could exercise their authority to regulate
transportation charges either by direct legislation or through a commission. But states could
not apply either procedure to set a rate "which
is so unreasonable as to practically destroy the
value of property of persons engaged in the carrying business." It followed that there was "an
ultimate remedy" for aggrieved parties in the
federal courts, which had a duty to inquire into
the reasonableness of rates. 27
Speaking for the three dissenters, Justice Joseph D. Bradley complained that the decision
effectively overruled Munn and made the courts
"the final arbiter" in rate regulations. He maintained that the determination of reasonable
charges was a legislative question, involving
considerations of policy as well as remuneration. In his view, judicial relief was only available for fraudulent or arbitrary deprivation of
property. He insisted that in this case there was
no infringement of property rights "but merely
a regulation as to the enjoyment of property. "28
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FIG. 3. An 1894 map iUustrates the extensive route of the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway through
the upper Midwest and eastern Great Plains. Photograph courtesy of the Milwaukee Public Library, Milwaukee

Road Collection.

REsPONSE

Whatever the ambiguities of Justice Blatchford's opinion, contemporary observers were
quick to perceive a sea change in the Supreme
Court's attitude toward rate regulations. "It is
everywhere regarded as a most important decision," the New York Times reported. Railroad
officials were elated. An assistant general manager of the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul
Railway commented that "the decision is a ray
of hope to railroads oppressed by confiscatory
legislation." One railroad agent declared that
the cartiers "could now feel secure of their property." Another railroad manager added, "I think

the action of the highest court in the country
will call a halt on this [granger] class of legislation." The Winona Daily Republican quipped:
"Whenever you see a railroad man smile now
a days you may look to the Supreme court decision for its inspiration. "29
Reaction in Minnesota was generally hostile.
As might be expected, the Populists were particularly bitter. The executive committee of the
State Farmers' Alliance unanimously adopted a
series of resolutions prepared by Ignatius Donnelly severely censuring the Supreme Court.
The resolutions declared that the Chicago, Milwaukee decision signified "the subjection of the
people and the states to the unlimited control
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of the railroad corporations of this country."
Attacking the concept of judicial review, the
resolutions appealed "from this second Dred
Scott decision to the people of the nation; and
we ask them to consider whether any other race
would submit to have their liberties thus wheedled away from them, on technicalities, by a
squad of lawyers, sitting as a supreme authority
high above Congress, president and people."
Last, the executive committee charged that in
"our anxiety to protect the rights of property
we have created a machinery which threatens
to destroy the rights of man. "30
Newspaper comment, while more restrained,
was also largely negative. The Minneapolis Tribune maintained that "the Western Legislatures
and commissions have in general been sufficiently lenient and reasonable in their demands
for reduction of rates." Although agreeing that
the railroads should have a right to be heard,
the Tribune worried that the decision might allow the carriers "through tediously and cunningly delayed litigation to break down" the
power of regulation. Similarly, the Red Wing
Argus observed that the Chicago, Milwaukee ruling caused people to wonder "whether the legislators or the courts made the laws of the land."
The Winona Daily Republican charged that the
Supreme Court "takes the purely technical view
of the question involved, and ... looks first of
all and chiefly to the interests of the roads. "31
In contrast, the St. Paul Dispatch hailed the
Chicago, Milwaukee ruling and decried the 1887
act as "the product of an unreasoning warfare
upon the railroads." The Dispatch called upon
the legislature to adopt "the more moderate policy" of the eastern states in supervising railroad
operations. Likewise the St. Paul Pioneer Press
commended the Supreme Court for fixing "an
insuperable barrier against the tide of destructive agrarian and confiscatory legislation and
judicial decisions which have threatened the
unlimited spoliation of all railroad properties. "3Z
Leading legal journals tended to look with
favor on the Chicago, Milwaukee decision. An
article in the Albany Law Journal defended judicial review of rates "because if otherwise, it
would be giving to the Legislature the authority

of deciding the constitutionality of their own
acts." One commentator in the America Law
Register construed the decision as strengthening
the rights of property owners against the imposition of rates that resulted in a deprivation
of property. He declared that "all lovers of individualliberty, of law and justice can properly
rejoice. It is a most momentous decision. " Such
enthusiasm was not universal. A note in the
American Law Review sharply criticized the ruling and emphasized the interpretative problems
posed by Justice Blatchford's ambiguous opinion. The author was uncertain whether the decision turned on a narrow procedural point or
established broad judicial supervision of legislative rate determinations. If it implied the latter, he decried the decision as "an overturning
of the fundamental principles upon which all
our American governments are founded. "33
As the debate over Chicago, Milwaukee raged,
Minnesota officials worked to salvage the regulatory scheme. The railroad commissioners
recommended that the law be amended to include judicial review of rates. This approach was
adopted by Governor William R. Merriam, a
Republican, in his 1891 message to the legislature. Avoiding any criticism of the decision,
he pointed out that when the regulatory statute
was enacted it was generally understood that
the legislature was the final arbiter as to what
rates were reasonable. Governor Merriam explained that the Supreme Court
has determined that action upon such matters is not final either in a commission or in
the legislature itself. The power of the legislature to make reasonable rates for common
carriers is not denied, but whether a given
rate so made is reasonable is a judicial question, and must be settled as other matters of
law and fact are determined, through the
medium of the courts. 34
Accordingly, he urged a statutory amendment
to provide a method of judicial review.
Heeding the governor's request, lawmakers
amended the 1887 rate statute. Much of the
earlier measure was unchanged, but the amend-
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ment stipulated that rates set by the commission
should be treated only as prima facie evidence
of reasonableness. The amendment also provided for notice and a full administrative hearing before the commission. Finally, the amended
statute expressly established the right of a railroad to appeal commission orders to the state
district courts, which had jurisdiction to examine "the whole matter in controversy. "35
These changes brought the Minnesota rate law
into conformity with the constitutional requirements of Chicago, Milwaukee.
ASSESSMENT

Although' a major victory for the railroads,
the outcome in Chicago, Milwaukee did not inaugurate an era of laissez-faire in the transportation industry. The fears of the Populists to the
contrary, the Supreme Court continued to recognize the power of state legislatures to regulate
railroad and storage rates. The federal judiciary
only protected carriers against unreasonable
charges, and the railroads had to demonstrate
their unreasonableness. 36 Still, the Chicago,
Milwaukee ruling materially restricted state regulatory authority, and lawsuits seeking to invalidate state-imposed rates multiplied rapidly
in the next decade.
Despite the Supreme Court's retreat from the
Munn doctrine, the decision was not an abrupt
departure from existing constitutional norms.
Starting in 1886 the court had cautioned in
several cases that states could not, consistent
with due process, impose confiscatory rates on
regulated industries. 37 The justices came to realize that unlimited power of regulation might
be used to destroy the value of railroad property.
Once the Supreme Court distinguished between
rate regulation and confiscation, judicial supervision of rates followed logically. Judicial
oversight simply provided a vehicle by which
the justices could vindicate property rights
against confiscatory legislation. If the states had
unlimited power to fix charges, then constitutional protection against confiscation was illusory and regulated industries had only those
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rights to use property that lawmakers chose to
recognize.
Why did the Supreme Court move away from
the Munn doctrine of unfettered legislative power
to control rates? Scholars have sometimes depicted Chicago, Milwaukee as part of a pervasive
pro-business bias on the part of the justices. 38
This rationale is problematic. After all, during
the Gilded Age the Supreme Court upheld many
state-imposed regulations on business activity.
A more compelling explanation, offered by Mary
Cornelia Porter, is that the court "was less interested in rate regulation per se than in assuring
that regulated utilities would continue to attract
the investment capital necessary for expanding
and improving services to the public. "39 The
importance of investment security was clear to
contemporary observers. One railroad official
revealingly stressed that the Chicago, Milwaukee
decision "will afford a very great safeguard to
railroad investments." He explained that the
ruling "comes at a very opportune time, for the
reason that the frequent attacks in the West on
railroad property by legislators and commissioners were beginning to sap the confidence of
investors all over the world in the safety of
investments in American railroad properties. "40
This was a crucial point because Europeans invested heavily in many western railroads, including the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul
Railway. 41
Railroads long had feared that legislatively
imposed rates would favor local interests and
discourage long-term economic growth. An official of the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul
Railway explained that
the railways have back of their adjustment
of the rates the selfish interest of their own
prosperity, which depends upon the prosperity of all the business on their lines, while
a political commission if given this power
would have nothing at stake but the political
success of the influences which placed it in
office. 42
The growing intensity of rate regulation in the
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Gilded Age made the court more aware of the
deficiencies in the Munn doctrine and increasingly sympathetic to the position of the railroads. In short, experience served to undermine
judicial confidence in legislative and administrative rate determinations. Gradually the justices saw Munn in a new light. While no doubt
concerned about unwarranted intrusion on the
property rights of the railroads, the court also
sought to fashion uniform national standards
that guarded investment capital against impairment by inadequate compensation. Further,
it became apparent that out-of-state investors
had no meaningful opportunity to "resort to the
polls" for protection, as suggested in Munn. Judicial redress was the only realistic remedy
against unduly low rates.
Perhaps the most significant consequence of
Chicago, Milwaukee, however, was its far-reaching impact on the constitutional protection of
property rights generally. By mandating the judicial review of imposed rates, the Supreme
Court implicitly recognized that protection of
property went beyond title and possession.
Ownership encompassed the right to use property for economic value. This step markedly
enlarged the range of property interests secured
by the Constitution. 43 In addition the decision
opened the door for the doctrine of economic
due process. Once the Supreme Court accepted
the notion that the due process clause mandated
reasonableness in the context of rate controls,
it was an easy step to apply this substantive
restraint to economic regulations generally. 44
Soon the court was assessing regulations against
a reasonableness standard and striking down
measures it deemed unduly restrictive of property rights. 45
The Chicago, Milwaukee ruling also had implications for the reach of the takings clause of
the Fifth Amendment. The court's expressed
worry that rate regulations might deprive the
railroad of its property without due process portended extension of the takings clause to the
states. In fact the dissenters had complained
that the majority opinion proceeded on the assumption that the Constitution prohibited the
states from taking private property without

compensation. The dissenting justices pointed
out that "there is no such clause," and that the
states could make their own regulations governing the payment of just compensation. 46 Yet
the majority opinion's tendency to assimilate
due process protection of property with deprivation of lawful usage foreshadowed a prompt
judicial move to enlarge the guarantees available to property owners under the Fifth Amendment. In Chicago, BurUngtan and Quincy Railroad
Company v. Chicago (1897) the justices unanimously held that the just compensation requirement constituted an essential element of
due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 47 Hence, the just compensation
principle became in effect the first provision of
the Bill of Rights to be applied against the states.
The Chicago, Milwaukee ruling had a particular impact on the states of the Great Plains.
Responding to farmer dissatisfaction with the
management of railroads, lawmakers in the prairie jurisdictions enacted a host of laws designed
to restrict passenger and freight rates and the
charges of grain elevators. Consequently, enlarged judicial review of railroad charges would
be felt keenly in the Great Plains. Indeed much
of the rate litigation after 1890 originated from
the prairie states. 48
An unresolved question raised by Chicago,
Milwaukee, of course, was how to distinguish a
valid rate regulation from a confiscatory rate.
The Supreme Court wrestled with this complex
issue in a number of cases during the 1890s.
Eventually, in Smyth v. Ames (1898), the court
unanimously held that a utility was constitutionally entitled to a "fair return" upon the "fair
value" of its property.49 An attempt to protect
regulated industries against confiscatory rates,
the fair value rule proved difficult to administer.
In the ensuing decades federal courts became
heavily involved in supervising the rate-making
process. 50At the same time Congress enacted a
series of statutes that imposed more stringent
federal controls over railroad charges. 51
CONCLUSION

Chicago, Milwaukee was a landmark case in
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which the Supreme Court moved toward more
vigorous protection of property rights. Historians, influenced by the Progressive school, have
often criticized the decision for giving federal
courts the power to review the substantive reasonableness of state-imposed rates. Charles
Fairman, for example, championed the Munn
doctrine and Justice Bradley's dissenting opinion in Chicago, Milwaukee. "Who can doubt,"
he asked, "that the Court would have done
much better had it never quit the path Justice
Bradley first pointed out?"52
This analysis, however, is open to dispute.
Farmers and shippers who called for railroad rate
regulations often pursued an opportunistic course
that benefite'd their economic interests. In a
sense, then, the movement for railroad regulation sought a redistribution of wealth from the
carriers to consumers. State agencies frequently
yielded to parochial pressures in setting rates,
thereby threatening the long-term economic
health of the railroads. Yet only by generating
a profit could the railroads attract capital investment and continue to provide services. It
followed that state rate regulations had a direct
impact on national transportation policy. Herbert Hovenkamp has pointed out that "the potential for abuse, particularly for free-riding by
the states, was substantial, and federal control
by either legislation or judicial intervention was
clearly necessary. " The federal courts, he added,
were "the only competent federal arm to control
state ftee-riding and protect the integrity of the
national railroad system. "53
Although criticized for granting the federal
courts authority to review the substance of rates,
the justices of the Supreme Court followed sound
instincts. Judicial review placed some restraint
on the marked tendency of legislators and regulators to set railroad rates at unrealistically low
levels, often at the behest of special interest
groups. Despite the rule of Smyth v. Ames, governmental regulation of railroad charges steadily
increased in the early decades of the twentieth
century. Indeed several scholars have identified
heavy-handed rate regulation and cumbersome
rate-setting procedures as major factors in the
decline of America's railroads. 54 Arguably the
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court should have reviewed rates more aggressively to protect the security of capital investment and thus encourage maintenance of an
adequate rail service.
Last Chicago, Milwaukee has demonstrated
impressive staying power. Following the constitutional revolution of 1937 the Supreme Court
abandoned economic due process, retreated from
meaningful review of rate fixing, and relegated
property rights to a secondary position. 55 But
the Supreme Court has never overruled Chicago, Milwaukee and continues to require judicial review of administrative decisions touching
on constitutional rights. Recently the Supreme
Court has even shown renewed interest in constitutional restraints on utility rate making. In
Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch (1989) ChiefJustice William Rehnquist, speaking for the court,
reiterated the long-standing rule: "The guiding
principle has been that the Constitution protects utilities from being limited to a charge for
their property serving the public which is so
'unjust' as to be confiscatory. "56 Rehnquist
stressed that a rate must afford adequate compensation. Thus after one hundred years Chicago,
Milwaukee continues to influence constitutional
law and provide at least symbolic protection to
property rights.
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